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SHIFTING AWAY FROM
REHABILITATION:
STATE V. LADD’S
EQUAL PROTECTION
CHALLENGE TO ALASKA’S
AUTOMATIC WAIVER LAW
This Note discusses the current controversy in Alaska regarding
Alaska’s automatic waiver provision.  The provision permits juve-
niles accused of serious crimes to be tried as adults, and includes a
burden-shifting provision for juveniles petitioning to return to the
juvenile system.  The potential for disparate sentencing for identi-
cal crimes implicates the Equal Protection Clause of the Alaska
Constitution.  The Note traces the case of State v. Ladd, currently
before the Alaska Supreme Court, and discusses the equal protec-
tion issues that arise.  First, the Note explains the burden shifting
provision.  Second, the Note argues that a minor has an important
interest in remaining in the juvenile system.  Third, the Note con-
tends that the state’s does not have a compelling interest in shifting
the burden of proof.  Fourth, the Note asserts that waiver provi-
sion was not a reasonably close fit between the means chosen by
the legislature and the goals of the legislation.  The Note concludes
by suggesting constitutional alternatives that more effectively pro-
mote the state’s goal of rehabilitating juveniles.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Alaska Supreme Court recently granted review to a case
that implicates the equal protection rights of juvenile defendants.
In State v. Ladd,1 the Fairbanks public defender’s office challenged
a provision of Alaska’s automatic waiver law that effectively can
create a disparate sentencing structure for juveniles convicted of
the same crime.  The automatic waiver law – which came into ef-
fect in 1994 when the Alaska legislature amended its juvenile de-
linquency laws – removes from the jurisdiction of juvenile courts
minors over the age of sixteen charged with specified serious felo-
Copyright © 1998 by Alaska Law Review
1. 951 P.2d 1220 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
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nies.2  The minor can be returned to the juvenile system for sen-
tencing if he or she is not convicted of the serious felony but is in-
stead convicted of a charge that would not have triggered the
waiver provision.  However, to regain the benefits of juvenile
treatment, the minor must demonstrate at a judicial hearing that
he or she is amenable to treatment in juvenile rehabilitation pro-
grams.
This procedure differs from that accorded to juveniles origi-
nally charged only with the same lesser offense that is exempt from
the automatic waiver.  Minors originally charged with the lesser of-
fense remain in the juvenile system unless the state requests a
hearing and proves that the juvenile is not amenable to the treat-
ment offered in juvenile rehabilitation programs, and conse-
quently, should be tried in adult court.  Adjudication and sentenc-
ing in adult rather than juvenile court deprives the minor of
significant legal protections and presumptions.  This Note argues
that shifting the burden of proof to juveniles subject to the auto-
matic waiver unfairly discriminates between these juveniles and
those juveniles convicted of the same crimes but who were not
subject to the waiver.  This discrimination violates the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Alaska Constitution.
Despite due process and equal protection challenges, auto-
matic waivers have been upheld in a number of jurisdictions.3
2. Former ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.010(e) (Michie 1995) (repealed 1996).  In
1996, the Alaska legislature revised and renumbered the statutory sections ad-
dressing children in need of aid and delinquent minors.  See 1996 Alaska Sess.
Laws 59.  Alaska Statutes § 47.12.100 provides for a waiver of children’s court ju-
risdiction if, after a hearing, a court finds “that there is probable cause for be-
lieving that a minor is delinquent and finds that the minor is not amenable to
treatment.”  ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.100 (1998) (Due to their recent passage, many
of the Alaska Statute sections cited in this Note currently are available electroni-
cally only.  Those sections are noted by the absence of “Michie” in the citation
parenthetical containing the year.).  Alaska Statutes § 47.12.030 provides for
automatic waiver by removing from the protection of the Alaska Delinquency
Rules without a hearing those juveniles over the age of sixteen who have been
charged with one of the enumerated felony offenses.  See ALASKA STAT. §
47.12.030 (1998).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1333-34 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(upholding the District of Columbia’s automatic waiver law); Woodard v. Wain-
wright, 556 F.2d 781, 783-86 (5th Cir. 1977) (upholding Florida statute that pro-
vided for automatic waiver of juveniles indicted of offenses punishable by death
or life imprisonment); Cox v. United States, 473 F.2d 334, 335 (4th Cir. 1973)
(upholding a U.S. Attorney’s discretion to determine whether a juvenile would be
tried and sentenced as an adult as “a prosecutorial decision beyond the reach of
the due process rights of counsel and a hearing”); People v. Parrish, 216 Mich. Ct.
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However, the provision at issue in Ladd differs from the waiver
statutes of most states because it creates an unnecessary presump-
tion against juvenile treatment after the juvenile has been found
not guilty of the offense that triggered the waiver.
Part II of this Note explains the constitutional issues that arise
from the automatic waiver statute and the resulting shift in the
burden of proof.  It also reviews the history of Ladd, the constitu-
tional analysis applied by the underlying courts, and the question
that is currently before the Alaska Supreme Court.
Part III then examines the first prong of the Alaska Constitu-
tion’s three-pronged equal protection analysis:  The minor’s inter-
est in being sentenced as a juvenile.  Adult sentencing is signifi-
cantly different than juvenile sentencing.  As a juvenile, a minor is
entitled to privacy, treatment, and leniency.  Juveniles convicted as
adults face harsher penalties and a permanent criminal record.
Minors have little likelihood of rehabilitation when incarcerated
with adult felons in prisons that lack suitable treatment programs.
Part IV investigates the second prong of the court’s analysis: the
strength of the state interest in placing the burden of proof on the
juvenile.  Part V examines the third prong – the tightness of the
relationship between the statutory provision and the goals the leg-
islature intended to fulfill – and concludes that the Alaska Su-
preme Court should reverse the court of appeals and declare
Alaska Statutes section 47.12.030(a) unconstitutional.  In closing,
Part VI discusses alternatives that accomplish the state’s goals and
promote the rehabilitation of youthful offenders, while avoiding
the equal protection problems that the current statute creates.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF STATE V. LADD
A. Automatic Waiver in Alaska
In 1994, Alaska amended its juvenile justice provisions to in-
clude an automatic waiver law.  The automatic waiver law removes
from the protection of the Alaska Delinquency Rules, without a
judicial hearing, those sixteen or seventeen year-old minors who
are charged with an offense  “(1) that is an unclassified felony or a
class A felony and the felony is a crime against a person; or (2) of
                                                                                                                                
App. 178, 181-82 (Mich. App. 1996) (rejecting due process challenge to Michigan
statute that permitted prosecutor to choose forum in which to try 15 to 17 year-
old minors charged with an enumerated offense).  But see State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d
991, 1006 (Utah 1995) (striking down statute that permitted prosecutors to bypass
the juvenile system and directly file charges in adult court); Hughes v. State, 653
A.2d 241, 253 (Del. 1994) (rejecting constitutionality of statute providing for
waiver of juveniles who reached the age of eighteen prior to adjudication).
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arson in the first degree.”4  The removal causes the minor to be
“charged prosecuted and sentenced in the superior court in the
same manner as an adult.”5  In 1998, the statute was amended to
include additional offenses within its provisions.6
The Alaska legislature was mindful that in some instances mi-
nors subject to automatic waiver would not be convicted of the
original charge.  The statute explicitly provides that a minor con-
victed of an offense that would not originally have triggered the
waiver provision, “may attempt to prove, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that the minor is amenable to [rehabilitative] treat-
ment.”7  Four factors will be considered in order to determine the
minor’s amenability to rehabilitation under juvenile programs: the
seriousness of the offense with which the minor is charged, the mi-
nor’s history of delinquency, the probable cause of the minor’s de-
linquent behavior, and the facilities available for treatment.8
If a juvenile is not charged with one of the aforementioned of-
fenses, he will remain in the juvenile system unless the state peti-
tions the juvenile court for a waiver of jurisdiction.  If removal is
granted, the juvenile will be prosecuted in adult court.9  In order to
prevail at a juvenile hearing convened to consider the waiver, the
state must show that the minor cannot be rehabilitated by the age
of twenty.10
Therefore, if a juvenile originally is charged with an offense
that would not trigger the waiver provision, the minor is presumed
to be amenable to treatment, and under the Alaska Delinquency
Rules for the same lesser crime, the state bears the burden to have
4. Former ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.010(e) (Michie 1995) (repealed 1995).
5. Id.  The statute was amended in 1998 to read: “The minor shall be
charged, held, released on bail, prosecuted, sentenced, and incarcerated in the
same manner as an adult.”  ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.030(a) (1998).
6. The statute presently excludes from the protections of the Alaska Delin-
quency Rules juveniles charged with
an offense that is a class B felony and the felony is a crime against a per-
son in which the minor is alleged to have used a deadly weapon in the
commission of the offense and the minor was previously adjudicated as a
delinquent or convicted as an adult, in this or another jurisdiction, as a
result of an offense that involved use of a deadly weapon in the commis-
sion of a crime against a person or an offense in another jurisdiction
having elements substantially identical to those of a crime against a per-
son and the previous offense was punishable as a felony.
Id. at. § 47.12.030(a)(3) (as amended and enacted into law July 1, 1998).
7. ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.030(a) (Michie 1996).
8. ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.100(b) (Michie 1996).
9. See id. § 47.12.100(a).
10. See id. § 47.12.100(b).
MAY.QUALITY.DOC 11/13/98  10:44 AM
1998] JUVENILE AUTOMATIC WAIVER LAW 371
the juvenile placed in adult court.11  Alternatively, when a minor is
charged with a triggering offense, but is convicted instead of a
lesser offense not specified in the statute, the minor is presumed to
be unamenable to treatment.12  This sentencing scheme treats two
similarly-situated minors convicted of the same crime differently,
and therefore implicates Alaska’s constitutional guarantee of equal
protection under the law.
B. Equal Protection Under the Alaska Constitution
The Alaska Constitution reflects equal protection principles13
that are distinct from federal equal protection principles, and em-
ploys a “sliding scale”14 in order to determine what kind of state
justification permits encroachment on an individual interest.15  As
such, the Alaska Equal Protection Clause is more protective of in-
dividual rights than the United States Constitution and permits
courts to enumerate interests deserving greater judicial protection
beyond strictly defined classifications.  A court may determine that
an individual interest is very important and safeguard the right
from state encroachment regardless of whether the classification
(the types of individuals that are treated differently by the law) is
based on race or gender or affects a fundamental right.16  Even if
11. See State v. Ladd, 951 P.2d 1220, 1221 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
12. See id. at 1222.
13. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 1 states:
This constitution is dedicated to the principles that all persons have a
natural right to life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, and the enjoyment
of the rewards of their own industry; that all persons are equal and enti-
tled to equal rights, opportunities, and protection under the law; and that
all persons have corresponding obligations to the people and to the
State.
Id. (emphasis added).
14. See Ladd, 951 P.2d at 1221.
15. See Paul E. McGreal, Alaska Equal Protection: Constitutional Law or
Common Law?, 15 ALASKA L. REV. 209 (1998) (offering an in-depth discussion
of Alaska’s equal protection jurisprudence as distinguished from its federal coun-
terpart).
16. The United States Supreme Court generally has determined the amount
of equal protection scrutiny with which it will look at a challenged statute by the
type of classification system that the statute creates.  See City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989) (plurality opinion) (applying strict scru-
tiny to municipal plan requiring contractors to award subcontracts to “Minority
Business Enterprises” and finding plan an impermissible race-based classifica-
tion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446-47 (1972) (rejecting Massachusetts
statute permitting married persons, but not unmarried persons, to obtain contra-
ceptives on the ground that there was no rational basis for the differential treat-
ment).
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the court finds that the interest is not very important, it must still
require that the government’s methods have a “fair and substantial
relation” to the statute’s intended purpose.
The Alaska Supreme Court has rejected  “the traditional two-
tiered federal approach in favor of a more flexible ‘sliding scale’
test.”17  The difference in these types of analyses was set forth in
State Department of Revenue v. Cosio18:
Analysis under our state equal protection clause is considerably
more fluid than under its federal counterpart.  Instead of using
three levels of scrutiny, we apply a sliding scale under which
“[t]he applicable standard of review for a given case is to be de-
termined by the importance of the individual rights asserted and
by the degree of suspicion with which we view the resulting clas-
sification scheme.”  As the right asserted becomes “more fun-
damental” or the classification scheme employed becomes
“more constitutionally suspect,” the challenged law “is subjected
to more rigorous scrutiny at a more elevated position on our
sliding scale.”19
The Alaska sliding scale inquiry consists of a three-step analy-
sis of the interests involved to determine “what weight should be
afforded the constitutional interest impaired by the challenged en-
actment.” 20  The first step is to determine the nature of the interest
at stake.21  As the supreme court has noted, “[t]he nature of this in-
terest is the most important variable in fixing the appropriate level
of review” and may be determinative of the eventual disposition of
the case.22  A purely economic interest, such as a right to receive a
permanent fund dividend while incarcerated,23 a right to receive
unemployment benefits,24 or a right to be free from disparate taxa-
tion,25 does not require stringent review.  However, an interest af-
fecting “a basic necessity” or “a fundamental right” will qualify for
enhanced scrutiny,26 and such heightened scrutiny places a heavy
burden on the state to justify the suspect legislation, increasing the
likelihood that the statute will be struck down.27  If a court finds in-
stead that the interest at stake does not warrant heightened scru-
17. State v. Anthony, 810 P.2d 155, 157 (Alaska 1991).
18. 858 P.2d 621 (Alaska 1993).
19. Id. at 629 (quoting State v. Ostrosky, 667 P.2d 1184, 1192-93 (Alaska
1983)).
20. Alaska Pacific Assurance Co. v. Brown, 687 P.2d 264, 269 (Alaska 1984).
21. See id.
22. Id.
23. See 810 P.2d 155, 158 (Alaska 1991).
24. See Sonneman v. Knight, 790 P.2d 702, 705 (Alaska 1990).
25. See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. State, 705 P.2d 418, 436-37 (Alaska 1985).
26. Anthony, 810 P.2d at 158.
27. See Brown, 687 P.2d at 269.
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tiny, then the challenger faces a heavy burden to show that the
statute is unconstitutional.28  Therefore, the initial determination
regarding the importance of the interest significantly affects the
eventual disposition.
Once the nature and scope of the affected interest is deter-
mined, the court will assess the purpose or purposes the statute
was intended to serve.29  The extent to which a court will question
the legislature’s motivations depends on the importance of the in-
terest.  For instance, “the state may be required to show only that
its objectives were legitimate, at the low end of the continuum, or,
at the high end of the scale, that the legislation was motivated by a
compelling state interest.”30  If the interest is only granted mini-
mum scrutiny, then the challenger has a very heavy burden: to
prove that the statute is not reasonably related to a legitimate gov-
ernment interest, while “[t]he state need only show that the dis-
tinctions drawn bear a fair and substantial relationship to the stat-
ute’s objective.”31  Alternatively, if the interest is so important that
it warrants heightened scrutiny, the court must find a “compelling”
state interest in upholding the statute that justifies the encroach-
ment on important individual rights.32
The third prong of the inquiry requires the court to evaluate
the means-ends fit of the method employed by the state.  At the
high end of the scale, “if the purpose can be accomplished by a less
restrictive alternative, the classification will be invalidated.”33  If
only minimum scrutiny is granted, the state needs to show that the
enactment  bears “a fair and substantial relationship” to the legis-
lative purpose.34  Under this test, the court will not look at the
availability of other alternatives.35  Rather, if the statute merely ac-
complishes a legitimate legislative purpose, even through broad-
28. See Anthony, 810 P.2d at 158.
29. See id. at 157; Brown, 687 P.2d at 269.
30. Brown, 687 P.2d at 269-70.
31. Anthony, 810 P.2d at 159.
32. See id. at 157.
33. Id. (quoting Brown, 687 P.2d at 269-70).
34. See id. at 159; Sonneman v. Knight, 790 P.2d 702, 705 (Alaska 1990).
35. See Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359, 362 (Alaska 1976) (discussing
Alaska’s shift toward a more exacting scrutiny and stating that “as a result, we
will no longer hypothesize facts which would sustain otherwise questionable leg-
islation”); Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm’n v. Apokedak, 606 P.2d 1255,
1264 n.39 (Alaska 1980) (commenting on Isakson’s rejection of a hypothesized
purpose because “close examination of the statutory scheme will usually yield
several concrete legislative purposes having a substantial basis in reality”).
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reaching means, the most narrow alternative need not be
adopted.36
C. State v. Ladd
Already, State v. Ladd has emerged as a case that demon-
strates the inequality inherent in the waiver statute.  In October
1995, sixteen year-old Anthony Ladd allegedly shot another boy
and was charged with assault in the first degree, a Class A felony.
Pursuant to Alaska’s automatic waiver law, Ladd was tried in adult
court.37  In February 1996, Ladd was found not guilty of the felony
charge and was convicted of fourth degree assault, a misde-
meanor.38  In order for Ladd to return to the juvenile system for
sentencing, the waiver law required him to prove his amenability
to treatment.39  However, had Ladd originally been charged with
the lesser offense, the state, rather than Ladd, would have borne
the burden of showing that Ladd was not amenable to treatment in
order to remove him to adult criminal court.40
By the time Ladd was convicted, however, the superior court
had found the burden shift unconstitutional in the companion case
to Ladd, State v. Nao.41  When Ladd moved for an adjudication of
delinquency,42 the superior court applied its earlier ruling in Nao
and held that unless the state accepted its opportunity to file a
waiver petition to have Ladd sentenced as an adult, the “verdicts
[would] form a legal basis for an adjudication of delinquency.”43
Superior Court Judge Niesje J. Steinkruger had examined the
burden-shifting provision in Nao, prior to the defendant’s convic-
tion.44  She ruled that the Alaska Equal Protection Clause of the
36. See Apokedak, 606 P.2d at 1264 (citing State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1, 12
(Alaska 1978)).
37. See State v. Ladd, Case No. 4FA-395-3316CR, at 5 (Alaska Super. Ct.
Apr. 19, 1996).
38. See id. at 1-2; see also Defendant’s Motion for Disposition After Jury
Trial, State v. Ladd, No. 4FA-S95-3316CR (Alaska Super. Ct. Mar. 1, 1996).
39. See Ladd, No. 4FA-S95-3316CR, at 7.
40. See id. at 7-8.
41. Case No. 4FA-94-3671CR (Alaska Super. Ct. Mar. 8, 1995).  The court in
State v. Nao decided in March 1996 that the burden-shifting provision of the
automatic waiver statute was unconstitutional.  Ladd was decided in April 1996.
The court in Ladd adopted the arguments and conclusions of Nao.
42. Ladd’s motion requested that the superior court proceed under the
Alaska Delinquency Rules for sentencing under its ruling in State v. Nao.  See
Motion for Disposition of Matter After Jury Trial, State v. Ladd (No. 4FA-S95-
3316CR) (Mar. 8, 1995).
43. Ladd, No. 4FA-S95-3316CR, at 11.
44. See Nao, No. 4FA-94-3671CR, at 8-21.
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state constitution prohibited such discrimination between
“similarly situated individuals” during sentencing.45  Using the
three-prong equal protection analysis, she determined that a juve-
nile’s interest in not bearing the burden to prove that he is amena-
ble to treatment as a juvenile is very important, and she afforded
heightened scrutiny to the legislature’s classification scheme.46  She
found that “the state . . . failed to set out a compelling state interest
for treating juveniles different for disposition purposes when they
are convicted of a lesser crime,” and struck the provisions of the
statute containing the burden of proof requirement, leaving the
remainder of the automatic waiver provision intact.47
In Alaska, “[e]qual protection requires that those similarly
situated be treated equally and that those classifications made by
government which call for different treatment of its citizens be rea-
sonable.”48  The superior court determined that juveniles who
automatically are waived to adult court but convicted only of a
non-specified offense are similarly situated to juveniles who origi-
nally were charged with that same offense and therefore did not
trigger the automatic waiver provision.49  The Nao decision sub-
jected the burden-shifting provision to heightened equal protection
scrutiny.  The court found that
[b]ecause the individual rights are of high importance, the level
of scrutiny should be elevated.  The right to be treated by the
court’s juvenile jurisdiction for all crimes not specified in
[current Alaska Statutes section 47.12.030(a),] and receive the
attendant “non-adult” alternatives, is a “more fundamental”
right requiring substantial scrutiny of the classification created
by the legislat[ure] for burden of proof shifting.  Therefore, the
state must meet a high burden for justifying making one group of
sixteen and seventeen year old individuals carry the burden of
proving by a preponderance of evidence they are amenable to
treatment while the state has the burden of proving non-
amenability to treatment for a similarly situated group of sixteen
and seventeen year old individuals for waiver to adult status.50
By granting heightened scrutiny to the juvenile’s right to be
tried in a juvenile court, the superior court required the state to set
out a compelling reason for the statute.  The court then looked to
the purposes behind the legislation and determined that while
45. See id. at 12-21.
46. See id. at 13-15
47. Id. at 18.
48. Id. at 12 (quoting Ketchikan Gateway Borough, Alaska v. Breed, 639 P.2d
995 (Alaska 1991)).
49. See id. at 20.
50. Id. at 15.
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“[t]here are legitimate and compelling state interest reasons for
treating juveniles differently based on the severity of the crime . . .
and age . . ., the state has failed to set out a compelling state inter-
est for treating juveniles different for disposition purposes when
they are convicted of a lesser crime.”51  The distinction between
crimes alleged prior to trial and those for which a juvenile actually
was convicted, was sufficiently important to overcome other justi-
fications for the burden-shifting.
The court’s analysis rejecting the burden-shifting provision
initially was spelled out in Nao.52  Daniel Nao was convicted as
charged in adult criminal court.  As Nao was convicted of the ini-
tial waivable offense with which he was charged, he was never
given the opportunity to petition for return to the juvenile system.
Thus, the constitutionality of the burden-shifting provision was not
at issue on appeal.53  The court adopted the Nao analysis in Ladd.
After Anthony Ladd was convicted on a lesser charge, the state
appealed the decision of the superior court in Ladd, effectively ap-
pealing Nao’s determination that the statute is unconstitutional.54
In January 1998, in an opinion written by Judge Mannheimer,
the court of appeals reversed the superior court.55  The court of ap-
peals noted that in order to arraign the minor in adult court, there
must have been, in addition to the prosecutor’s initial decision to
charge the minor with a waivable offense, an original grand jury
finding of probable cause that the minor committed the alleged
enumerated offense.56  The court concluded that the differential
treatment of minors eventually convicted of the same offense was
justified because “there ha[d] been an independent determination
of probable cause to believe that the minor committed the more
serious crime.”57
The court of appeals agreed that the two groups of convicted
juveniles “must presumptively be deemed ‘similarly situated’ for
purposes of disposition – and, in particular, for purposes of decid-
ing whether the state or the minor should bear the burden of proof
on the issue of amenability to juvenile treatment.”58  However, the
court rejected the reasoning that the legislature classified the two
groups differently based solely on a discretionary prosecutorial de-
51. Id. at 17-18.
52. See id. at 8-21.
53. See Nao v. State, 953 P.2d 522 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
54. See State v. Ladd, 951 P.2d 1220 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
55. See id.
56. See id. at 1223.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1222.
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cision.59  The prosecutor’s demonstration of probable cause that
the minor committed the more serious offense was a “plausible ba-
sis” for the legislature’s decision to impose the burden-shifting
provision on one group of juveniles and not the other.60  The court
reviewed the statute with minimal scrutiny61 and concluded that “a
juvenile offender has no constitutional right to be tried in a juve-
nile court.”62  Thus, the state legislature could restrict access to ju-
venile treatment “so long as no arbitrary or discriminatory classifi-
cation is involved.”63
By requiring only a “plausible basis” for the legislature’s ac-
tion, the court implicitly stated that when a statute is subjected to
minimal scrutiny, any rational reason given by the legislature for
the statute will be sufficient.  Under prior Alaska equal protection
case law, the  court of appeals should have sought at least a “fair
and substantial relation” between the means and the ends of the
statute. 64  Alaska courts have applied this standard to place a
greater burden on the state to justify legislation that encroaches
upon important individual interests.65  In this case, the individual
interest at stake is sufficiently important to merit close scrutiny of
the legislature’s actions.
The next section of the Note begins the appropriate equal
protection analysis, applies it to State v. Ladd and concludes that
minors have a vital interest in remaining in the juvenile justice sys-
tem.
III. THE FIRST PRONG: THE VITAL INTEREST IN REMAINING IN
THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
Juveniles who are tried as adults lose protections afforded by
the Alaska Delinquency Rules, and the difference between treat-
ment as a juvenile and treatment as an adult offender is significant.
The legislature intended to solve a legitimate problem by placing
the burden of proof on the party it believed had better access to
relevant information regarding amenability to treatment.  The
resolution of this issue, however, implicated an important constitu-
tional right.  The supreme court should apply heightened equal
59. See id.
60. Id. at 1223.
61. See id. at 1225.
62. Id. at 1224 (quoting W.M.F. v. State, 723 P.2d 1298, 1300 (Alaska Ct. App.
1986)).
63. Id. at 1224-25 (quoting W.M.F., 723 P.2d at 1300.)
64. See Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm’n v. Apokedak, 606 P.2d 1255,
1264 n.39 (Alaska 1980); Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359, 362 (Alaska 1976).
65. See Apokedak, 606 P.2d  at 1264 n.39; Isakson, 550 P.2d at 362.
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protection scrutiny to the automatic waiver’s burden-shifting pro-
vision because the presumption in favor of amenability or uname-
nability to treatment may determine the eventual disposition of a
juvenile’s case.
The shifting of the burden of proof in waiver hearings66 was
the legislative response to R.H. v. State.67  The charges against R.H.
included first-degree murder and first-degree robbery.68  R.H. was
two months shy of his seventeenth birthday when he allegedly
committed the crimes with which he was charged.69  R.H.’s history
of delinquent behavior and his confessions of robbery and murder
led the state to file a petition for waiver of children’s court jurisdic-
tion.  The prosecutor requested a psychological evaluation to sup-
port the petition.70  The superior court granted a petition to compel
R.H. to submit to psychiatric evaluation to determine amenability
to rehabilitation.71  The evaluation involved elaborate procedural
safeguards designed to protect R.H. from self-incrimination and
ensure his right to counsel.72  On appeal, however, the court of ap-
peals remanded the case for re-examination without the psychiat-
ric evaluation, holding that the compelled evaluation violated
R.H.’s constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.73
66. The Alaska legislature has shifted the burden of proof in two types of
waiver hearings.  Under Alaska Statutes § 47.12.030(a), a 16 or 17 year-old minor
is entitled to a hearing only after he has been charged with a serious felony and
waived to adult court but has been convicted of less serious charges.  Alaska Stat-
utes § 47.12.100(c) applies to minors under the age of sixteen who also are charged
with certain serious felonies.  These minors can be waived into adult court only
after a hearing at which they bear the burden to show that they are amenable to
treatment as juveniles.
67. 777 P.2d 204 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989); see also House Judiciary Committee,
Letter of Intent for H.C.S. CSSB 54 (JUD), 1993 HOUSE J. 1382, available in
BASIS Alaska State 18th Legislature (visited Sept. 1, 1998)
<http://www.legis.state.ak.us/BASIS20.htm>.
68. See R.H., 777 P.2d at 205.
69. See id. at 206.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 207.
72. See id.
73. See id. at 211.  The court of appeals distinguished R.H. from the United
States Supreme Court’s decision in Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981).  Smith
rejected the use of a psychiatric evaluation in sentencing proceedings when the
examination was held outside the presence of defendant’s counsel and without
advising the defendant of his right to remain silent.  See id. at 462-63.  The Smith
Court suggested that the evaluation could be used for the “limited neutral pur-
pose of determining [Smith’s] competency,” but rejected its use at the sentencing
phase, stating that the evaluation violated the defendant’s protection against self-
incrimination.  Id. at 465.  In R.H., the court held that juvenile waiver proceedings
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The structure of Alaska’s present waiver system, which places
the burden of proof on the juvenile in waiver hearings, is an out-
growth of the state’s inability to compel a psychiatric evaluation
unless the defendant himself places his mental state at issue.74  The
legislature therefore intended to place the burden of evidence on
the party that supposedly has the best access to relevant informa-
tion.75
However, this legislation trammels a juvenile’s constitutional
right to equal protection in being treated as a juvenile.  The R.H.
court itself highlighted the uniqueness and significance of juvenile
waiver hearings by aligning those hearings with the adult sentenc-
ing proceedings, holding that  “[i]n contrast to competency pro-
ceedings, juvenile waiver hearings are hardly ‘neutral proceedings.’
Rather, they are fully adversary proceedings in which the burden
of establishing a child’s probable unamenability to treatment is
formally allocated to the state.”76  The court underscored the grav-
ity of waiver proceedings:
Nor can juvenile waiver proceedings realistically be said to affect
“only the forum where the issue of guilt will be adjudicated.”  A
juvenile waiver proceeding is the only available avenue by which
the state may seek to prosecute a child as an adult.  Conse-
quently, the stakes involved in such proceedings are high: “The
result of a fitness hearing is not a final adjudication of guilt; but
the certification of a juvenile offender to an adult court has been
accurately characterized as ‘the worst punishment the juvenile
system is empowered to inflict.’”77
A minor unable to defeat the presumption will face sentencing in
adult court.78 An adult sentence may irreparably harm a young of-
fender, and may even undermine the state’s interest in rehabili-
tating youthful defendants.
The recently enacted legislative reforms, including the waiver
provision, involve a drastic shift away from a more lenient and
                                                                                                                                
were not “neutral,” and that therefore the juvenile’s procedural rights needed
greater protection in such proceedings.  See R.H., 777 P.2d at 210-211.
74. See House Judiciary, Letter of Intent, supra note 67; see also R.H., 777
P.2d at 211 (“[T]he same conclusion [that the psychiatric examination violated the
constitutional privilege] would not be warranted had R.H. sought to present psy-
chiatric evidence on his own behalf at the waiver hearing or had he otherwise af-
firmatively placed his mental condition at issue.”).
75. See House Judiciary, Letter of Intent, supra note 67 and accompanying
text.
76. R.H., 777 P.2d at 210.
77. Id. (quoting Ramona R. v. Superior Court, 693 P.2d 789, 795 (Cal. 1985)).
78. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.030(a) (Michie 1996).
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sympathetic attitude toward juvenile offenders.79  When the con-
cept of a separate system for juveniles was originally conceived,
“all children were believed to be redeemable.”80  States have es-
tablished juvenile justice systems in order to provide a more flexi-
ble system wherein child offenders may be provided with the social
services necessary for their rehabilitation.  Based on the common
law theory of parens patriae, the juvenile justice system is rooted in
the idea that benevolent juvenile court judges with wide discretion
will redirect wayward children toward the path of reform.81
Generally, juvenile courts tend to be more lenient than adult
criminal courts,82 attempting to balance the youth’s age and family
circumstances with public safety concerns.  A 1987 national con-
ference on juvenile justice in New Orleans underscored the appro-
priateness of this leniency by recommending that juvenile courts
emphasize three goals: “(1) protection of the community, (2) im-
posing accountability, and (3) helping juveniles and equipping
them to live productively and responsibly in the community.” 83
Furthermore, the Conference noted that “[t]he justice system per-
ceives juveniles to have greater rehabilitative possibilities than
adults.”84  Youth implies flexibility and adaptability, and conse-
quently juveniles may be more likely to learn from their mistakes
and become responsible community members.
Special juvenile courts rely on discretionary sentencing to
make an individualized determination of a juvenile’s rehabilitative
potential.85  The feasibility of the system requires safeguarding the
juvenile’s due process rights by granting certain fundamental pro-
tections, but at the same time withholding others in order to pro-
vide necessary flexibility within the system.  When dealing with
79. Other indications of this shift include the enactment of victim’s rights leg-
islation that amended the Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure 6 and 43(d),
Alaska Rules of Evidence 404 and 615, and the Alaska Delinquency Rule 3.  See
e.g., 1997 Alaska Sess. Laws 63.  Among the Act’s modifications to existing law is
a provision that prevents a court from excluding a victim from a hearing or pro-
ceeding against a juvenile, even if the victim intends to be a witness against the
juvenile at a hearing.
80. Catherine J. Ross, Disposition in a Discretionary Regime: Punishment and
Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Justice System, 36 B.C. L. REV. 1037, 1038 (1995).
81. See id. at 1038-39.
82. See DEAN J. CHAMPION & G. LARRY MAYS, TRANSFERRING JUVENILES TO
CRIMINAL COURTS: TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 85-86
(1991).
83. Id. at 86 (citing Dennis Maloney et al., Juvenile Probation: The Balanced
Approach, 39 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 1 (1988)).
84. Id.
85. See Ross, supra note 80, at 1038-39.
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minors accused of crimes that may result in incarceration, juvenile
courts must provide the following procedural protections:
“representation by counsel, notice of charges, confrontation and
cross-examination of witnesses, protection against self-
incrimination, protection from double jeopardy, proof of delin-
quency charges ‘beyond a reasonable doubt,’ and protection from
judicial transfer to criminal court without hearing, without effec-
tive assistance of counsel, and without a statement of reasons.”86
However, the United States Supreme Court has not required that
minors be provided every procedural safeguard afforded adult
criminal defendants.  For example, juvenile defendants do not
have a constitutional right to a jury trial, minors “may be detained
prior to trial on a far lower standard than would apply to an adult,
and [they] may be subjected to far greater judicial discretion in
disposition than adults in comparable circumstances.”87
The critical pronouncement on waiver hearings is set out in
the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Kent v. United
States.88  The Court held that juvenile offenders are entitled to as-
sistance of counsel at waiver hearings,89 and noted that the flexibil-
ity of juvenile courts does not negate the minor’s right to proce-
dural fairness:
The [j]uvenile [c]ourt is theoretically engaged in determining the
needs of the child and of society rather than adjudicating crimi-
nal conduct.  The objectives are to provide measures of guidance
and rehabilitation for the child and protection for society, not to
fix criminal responsibility, guilt and punishment . . . .  But the
admonition to function in a “parental” relationship is not an invi-
tation to procedural arbitrariness.90
The Kent court found that the consequences of waiver are suffi-
ciently serious to require important procedural protections:
[T]here is no place in our system of law for reaching a result of
such tremendous consequences without ceremony – without
hearing, without effective assistance of counsel, without a state-
ment of reason.  It is inconceivable that a court of justice dealing
with adults . . . would proceed in this manner.  It would be ex-
traordinary if society’s special concern for children . . . permitted
this procedure.  We hold that it does not.91
86. Id. at 1040 (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41, 33, 55, 57 (1967); Breed v.
Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970); Kent v.
United States, 383 U.S. 541, 553 (1966)).
87. Id.
88. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
89. See id. at 561.
90. Id. at 554-55.
91. Id. at 554.
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Alaska consistently has recognized the goals of treatment and
rehabilitation and generally has promulgated juvenile justice laws
in order to foster the promotion of those goals.  Recent amend-
ments to the juvenile justice laws have emphasized that young of-
fenders should be rehabilitated.92  Removing a juvenile offender
from the juvenile system and trying him as an adult may have a
significant impact on the final disposition of the case.  Juveniles
who are sent to adult court face the elimination of all rehabilitative
possibilities as the full weight of the criminal law is brought against
them.93
In addition to being convicted and labeled with a stigmatizing
criminal record, juveniles tried as adults lose the protections of the
Alaska Delinquency Rules, including: (1) treatment in the best in-
terest of the child; (2) protection of the privacy of the child; (3) ex-
pungement of the child’s delinquency records; (4) consideration of
sentence length in light of offender’s youth; and (5) consideration
of what kind of facility in which to place the child (i.e., an adult
prison, a youth facility or other dispositional alternatives such as
residential group homes, foster care or probation).94  These gener-
92. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.010 (1998).
93. See, e.g.,  ALASKA STAT. § 33.30.901(12) (1998) (defining “prisoner” as
“includ[ing] a minor committed to the custody of the commissioner when, under
Alaska Statutes section 47.12.030, 47.12.065, or 47.12.100, the minor has been
charged, prosecuted, or convicted as an adult”).
94. State v. Nao, Case No. 4FA-94-3671CR, at 14 (Alaska Super. Ct. Mar. 8,
1995).  In making its dispositional orders, a juvenile court shall
(1) consider both the best interests of the minor and the interests of the
public, and, in doing so, the court shall take into account
(A)  the seriousness of the minor’s delinquent act and the attitude
of the minor and the minor’s parents toward that act;
(B)  the minor’s culpability as indicated by the circumstances of the
particular case;
(C)  the age of the minor;
(D)  the minor’s prior criminal or juvenile record and the success or
failure of any previous orders, dispositions, or placements imposed
on the minor;
(E)  the effect of the dispositional order to be imposed in deterring
the minor from committing other delinquent acts;
(F)  the need to commit the minor to the department’s custody or to
detain the minor in an institution or other suitable place in order to
prevent further harm to the public;
(G)  the interest of the public in securing the minor’s rehabilitation;
and
(H)  the ability of the state to take custody of and care for the mi-
nor; and
(2)  order the least restrictive alternative disposition for the minor; for
purposes of this paragraph, the “least restrictive alternative disposition”
means that disposition that is no more restrictive than is, in the judgment
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ous provisions differ greatly from those afforded adult defendants,
supporting the conclusion that, “the right [to be tried as a juvenile]
is one of great importance and . . . has the potential to impact the
defendant throughout his entire life.”95
Alaska’s courts traditionally have granted substantial protec-
tion to juveniles that the state sought to remove to adult court,
recognizing that juveniles have a substantial interest in remaining
within the jurisdiction of juvenile courts.  In P.H. v. State,96 the
Alaska Supreme Court held that the statutory reference to “under
18 years of age” applied to the minor’s age at the time that the
crime was committed, not at the time that the minor was charged.97
The court stated:
[W]e note the principal precept behind the children’s court con-
cept: that a person under eighteen years of age does not have
mature judgment and may not fully realize the consequences of
his acts, and that therefore he should not generally have to bear
the stigma of a criminal conviction for the rest of his life.  To al-
low officials charged with the execution of the law to prosecute a
child offender as a criminal merely by deferring action until the
child’s eighteenth birthday would frustrate this purpose.  Finally,
serious constitutional issues would arise if the nature of the pro-
ceedings against a child offender were to depend on the arbitrary
decision of law enforcement officials.98
The court recognized that the impact of a waiver hearing is
“critically important” to the remainder of a juvenile’s life, and
stated that “[b]ecause the consequences of waiver are great, ‘the
hearing must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair
treatment.’”99
Other Alaska court decisions and statutory schemes have rec-
ognized the gravity of any decision to remove juveniles to adult
court.  In R.J.C. v. State,100 the Alaska Supreme Court stated that a
                                                                                                                                
of the court, most conducive to the minor’s rehabilitation taking into
consideration the interests of the public.
ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.140 (1998); see also ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.240 (Michie
1996) (permitting detention of a juvenile in an adult correctional facility for only
a limited time and requiring the minor’s separation from adult prisoners during
that time).
95. State v. Nao, Case No. 4FA-94-3671CR, at 14 (Alaska Super. Ct. Mar. 8,
1995).
96. 504 P.2d 837 (Alaska 1972).
97. See id. at 841-42.  In P.H., juvenile disposition was available because the
defendant was under 18 at the time of the crime.  However, the supreme court
upheld the waiver to adult court because there was sufficient evidence that she
was not amenable to treatment as a child.  See id. at 846.
98. Id. at 841-42 (emphasis added).
99. Id. at 842 (quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1966)).
100. 520 P.2d 806 (Alaska 1974).
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waiver hearing requires a “thorough examination of (1) the prob-
able cause for believing that the child committed the act with
which he was charged and (2) the amenability of the child to juve-
nile treatment.”101  Without judicial inquiry into both probable
cause and amenability, “there is no evidentiary basis for a waiver
decision.”102  Additionally, prior to 1994 and the enactment of
Alaska Statutes section 47.10.010(e), waiver to adult court re-
quired a thorough, meaningful review because of the severe and
far-reaching implications of trying and sentencing a minor as an
adult.103
In W.M.F. v. State,104 the court of appeals examined the
“preponderance of the evidence” standard of proof that the state
must sustain to show non-amenability to treatment at a waiver
hearing.  Although the court declined to raise the standard on due
process grounds, it recognized that “the interest of the minor is
important because the waiver hearing can mean the difference be-
tween six years’ imprisonment and a life sentence.”105
Inherent in the benefits of disposition as a juvenile – confiden-
tiality, opportunities for treatment, a greater possibility of being
given a “second chance” – is the juvenile’s very important interest
in being treated as a child.106  Automatic waiver of juveniles above
a certain age  effectively cuts off a group of juveniles from being
treated as children regardless of their individual characteristics and
circumstances.  As the Supreme Court noted, “[i]t is clear beyond
dispute that the waiver of jurisdiction is a ‘critically important’ ac-
tion determining vitally important statutory rights of the juve-
nile.”107
The real harshness in treating youthful offenders as adults lies
in the impact of adult sentences on a minor’s development.  One
scholar has noted that “[t]he mere fact that an eleven-year-old – or
even a seventeen-year-old – commits a crime does not suddenly
101. Id. at 807.
102. Id. (citing P.H., 504 P.2d at 846).
103. See Former ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.060 (Michie 1995); P.H., 504 P.2d at
845 (“To waive children’s court jurisdiction without a hearing or opportunity for
adversary presentation would be a denial of fair process.  To waive such jurisdic-
tion without substantial evidence having been presented that the child is uname-
nable to juvenile rehabilitation programs is no less so.”).
104. 723 P.2d 1298 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986).
105. Id. at 1300; see also R.H. v. State, 777 P.2d  204, 210 (Alaska Ct. App.
1989).
106. See Ross, supra note 80, at 1039.
107. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).
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transform that child into an adult.”108  Juveniles incarcerated in
prison are especially vulnerable to inmate violence and sexual as-
sault,109 and have a high risk of contracting AIDS.110  The isolation
associated with incarceration may breed mental illness or reinforce
existing feelings of anger and alienation,111 and adult prisons lack
treatment facilities that juvenile centers may be able to provide.
Imprisoned juveniles also have a high risk of suicide.112  As Ken-
neth Wooden observed in his exposé of the brutalities of juvenile
incarceration, Weeping in the Playtime of Others:
[G]iven the conditions of solitary confinement and incarceration
in general, it is impossible for a child about to commit suicide to
go to a crisis intervention center or make a hot line call.  There
are no hot lines for the isolated youngster.  There are no clergy-
men or counselors or friends to keep him company.  There are
no rehabilitation programs.  A suicidal incarcerated child is left
alone to cope with his own worst enemy – himself.113
As detailed above, a judgment that a minor is unamenable to
treatment can have serious repercussions throughout the rest of
the young offender’s life.  By shifting the burden of proof in waiver
hearings, the legislature unwisely has decided that minors guilty of
less serious offenses than at first charged should be presumed un-
treatable.  The critical nature of the interest at stake should man-
date stricter scrutiny by the supreme court.
IV. THE SECOND PRONG: THE COUNTERVAILING STATE
INTEREST
A. Conflicting State Interests: Deterrence and Rehabilitation
Equal protection analysis under the Alaska Constitution re-
quires courts to weigh the juvenile’s interest in being sentenced as
a juvenile against the state’s countervailing interest in enforcing
the waiver statute.  Juvenile crime laws serve conflicting public in-
terests.  The state has an interest in protecting public safety and
keeping dangerous offenders off the streets.114  Yet “[t]he public
108. Abbe Smith, They Dream of Growing Older: On Kids and Crime, 36 B.C.
L. REV. 953, 989 (1995).
109. See KENNETH WOODEN, WEEPING IN THE PLAYTIME OF OTHERS:
AMERICA’S INCARCERATED CHILDREN 110 (1976).
110. See James Farrow, Meeting the Challenges of Juvenile Health Care,
CORRECTIONS TODAY, Apr. 1, 1998, at 118, available in 1998 WL 13892424.
111. See WOODEN, supra note 109, at 133.
112. See id. at 158.
113. Id.
114. See State v. Ladd, 951 P.2d 1220, 1225 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
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[also] has an interest in rehabilitating wayward youths who are re-
habilitatable in their youth.”115  One study of public attitudes to-
ward juvenile justice concluded that the primary motivation be-
hind public support of treating juveniles as adults is the fear of
being a victim of crime.116  However, the study also found that
“[t]he public supports the juvenile court and its traditional empha-
sis on treatment and rehabilitation.”117
The perception that juveniles who commit felonies are not
treatable and pose a serious danger to society may be overblown.
Public perceptions of juvenile crime may be disproportionate to
the actual rate of violent crime in Alaska.  The 1996 Governor’s
Conference on Youth and Justice noted that although Alaska has a
high rate of youthful petty offenders, the state ranks thirty-seventh
in the nation in percentage of violent juvenile offenders.118  Despite
these statistics, Alaska rates second in the nation regarding the
percentage of its juveniles that are incarcerated and the length of
their confinement.119  The Governor’s Conference drew the
“unavoidable conclusion” that “Alaska is already tough on juve-
nile crime.”120  An alternative conclusion that may be drawn, how-
ever, is that a number of juvenile offenders in secure confinement
may be there unnecessarily.  Furthermore, although courts and
legislatures nationwide have become tougher on juvenile crime,
the harsher penalties seem to have had little impact on the rate of
juvenile crime.121
Punitive treatment of juveniles as adults may assuage public
fears of violent young predators, but early institutionalization
without rehabilitation is likely to lead to recidivism.122  As one
study found, “[n]ot only do a greater number of those who receive
punitive treatment continue to violate the law, but they also com-
mit more serious crime with greater rapidity than those who expe-
115. W.M.F. v. State, 723 P.2d 1298, 1300 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986).
116. See Ira M. Schwartz, Public Attitudes Toward Juvenile Crime and Juvenile
Justice: Implications for Public Policy, 13 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 241, 260
(1992).
117. Id. at 257.
118. See THE GOVERNOR’S CONFERENCE ON YOUTH AND JUSTICE, STATE OF
ALASKA, FINAL REPORT, at xiii (1996) (on file with Alaska Law Review).
119. See id. at xv.
120. Id.
121. See Smith, supra note 108, at 1008-09.  Smith notes that the crime statistics
at issue are conflicting and difficult to analyze, given the group nature of juvenile
crime.  She concludes, however, that “[t]hough we are now locking up more kids
than ever before and are doing so for longer and longer periods, the juvenile
crime rate has not been affected.”  Id. at 1008-09 n.215.
122. See WOODEN, supra note 109, at 39-43.
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rience a less constraining contact with judicial and correctional sys-
tems.”123
It is in the public’s interest to rehabilitate juvenile offenders
successfully.  Recent amendments to Title 47 of the Alaska Stat-
utes recognized the state goals of “promot[ing] a balanced juvenile
justice system . . . to protect the community, impose accountability
for violations of law, and equip juvenile offenders with the skills
needed to live responsibly and productively.”124  The legislature
recognized that a legitimate and important goal of a juvenile jus-
tice system is to “provide an early, individualized assessment and
action plan for each juvenile offender in order to prevent further
criminal behavior through the development of appropriate skills in
the juvenile offender so that the juvenile is capable of living pro-
ductively and responsibly in the community.”125  This significant
state interest, combined with the minor’s individual interest in be-
ing sentenced as a juvenile, should influence significantly the su-
preme court’s equal protection analysis.
B. The State Interest in Allocating Risk to the Juvenile
In Ladd, the court of appeals identified the state interest as
merely an allocation of risk to the juvenile offender in “close
cases.”126  The court of appeals in Ladd described the legislative
purpose behind the burden-shifting provision:  “In cases where the
evidence does not disclose whether a minor can be rehabilitated
under the juvenile system by age [twenty] . . . , the decision turn[s]
on whether the state has previously established probable cause to
believe that the minor has committed one of the [more] serious
felonies listed.”127  The court’s interpretation of this interest as
merely allocating the risk of error to the juvenile seriously under-
rates the significance of waiver proceedings.
123. Id. at 40 (quoting “Delinquency in a Birth Cohort,” study at the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania).
124. ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.010(a) (1998).
125. Id. § 47.12.010(b)(11).
126. State v. Ladd, 951 P.2d 1220, 1225 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998). The court of
appeals agreed with the superior court’s assumption that minors who have been
convicted of the same offense “must presumptively be deemed ‘similarly situated’
for purposes of disposition – and, in particular, for purposes of deciding whether
the state or the minor should bear the burden of proof on the issue of amenability
to juvenile treatment.”  Id. at 1222. It was the superior court’s second assumption
– that the basis for the difference in treatment between “similarly situated” juve-
niles rested merely on the prosecutor’s initial charging decision – that the appel-
late court rejected.  Id.
127. Id. at 1225.
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As noted above, the legislature enacted the statute in re-
sponse to R.H. v. State.128  The letter of intent from the House Judi-
ciary Committee prior to enactment underscores the legislative in-
tent to place the burden of proof on the party that had the best
access to the relevant facts:
[I]t is the offender himself who is in the best position to show
that he would be treatable in the juvenile court system.  The ju-
venile offender and his attorney are the ones who know the most
about the offender’s family and educational experiences, and are
in the best position to present information relating to the issue of
treatability to the court.129
This rationale is contradicted by the requirements of the statute
itself, because it lists a number of factors that a court may take into
account.  As noted above, the statute permits, but does not re-
quire, the court to consider four factors in determining whether a
juvenile can be rehabilitated: “the seriousness of the offense the
minor is alleged to have committed, the minor’s history of delin-
quency, the probable cause of the minor’s delinquent behavior,
and the facilities available to the department for treating the mi-
nor.”130
Both the state and the defendant will have equal access to in-
formation about the first two enumerated factors in the indictment
and the minor’s prior criminal or delinquency records.  While the
minor may have better access to information regarding his child-
hood, his family, and his education, the state undoubtedly will be
more knowledgeable about adequate treatment facilities.  After
trial in adult court, the state should have full access to the informa-
tion about the minor.  The shift in the burden unfairly places both
the responsibility for obtaining accurate information about these
factors and for overcoming a strong presumption against treatment
on the juvenile, who may lack adequate resources for investigation
and legal assistance.
C. The State Interest in Prosecutorial Discretion
The prosecutor exercises significant discretion throughout the
charging process and the grand jury proceedings.131  In fact, the
prosecutor “prepare[s] all indictments and presentments for the
grand jury, and attend[s] their sittings to advise them of their du-
ties and to examine witnesses in their presence.”132  Even an unbi-
128. 777 P.2d 204 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).
129. House Judiciary, Letter of Intent, supra note 67, at 1382.
130. ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.100(b) (Michie 1996).
131. See ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 6(i); ALASKA STAT. § 12.40.070 (Michie 1996).
132. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 6(i); ALASKA STAT. § 12.40.070.
MAY.QUALITY.DOC 11/13/98  10:44 AM
1998] JUVENILE AUTOMATIC WAIVER LAW 389
ased jury can be influenced by a zealous prosecutor, who, although
an officer of the court, is also an advocate of a successful prosecu-
tion.133  The Alaska Supreme Court has recognized that a prosecu-
tor wears two “sometimes inconsistent” hats during grand jury
proceedings, as both the grand jury’s “legal advisor” and as a
criminal prosecutor.134
The ultimate result of the automatic waiver law and the bur-
den-shifting provision is to entrust to the prosecutor substantial
authority to determine a juvenile’s proper jurisdiction.  This de-
termination continues to be influential when judicial processes
have determined that it is not supported by the evidence, i.e.,
where removal is based on which charges are brought against a
minor.  The charges continue to influence disposition of the mi-
nor’s case even where the minor is acquitted of the triggering
charges.  Critically, the state interest in automatic waiver cases also
lies in the total discretion of the prosecutor to decide in which fo-
rum the minor will be adjudicated, eradicating the need for a judi-
cial waiver hearing.  The initial charging decision combined with a
grand jury indictment determines whether the juvenile will be tried
in adult court.
In Ladd, the court of appeals held that the burden-shifting
provision was justified by the prosecutor’s showing of probable
cause and the grand jury’s decision to indict. 135  The arraignment,
which subjects the minor to prosecution as an adult, requires a
grand jury indictment, at which the state must show “that the evi-
dence . . . establishe[s] a probability of the [defendant’s] guilt.”136
Due to this original indictment, juveniles who later are adjudged
not guilty of the more serious offenses are presumed to be uname-
nable to treatment.137  The initial charging decision, even when de-
termined to have been erroneous, still governs whether the child
will be treated as a juvenile.
The appellate court concluded in Ladd:
Even if the State ultimately fails to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the minor committed the felony charged in the in-
dictment, and the minor is convicted of only a lesser offense, the
fact remains that there has been an independent determination
of probable cause to believe that the minor committed the more
serious crime.138
133. See Coleman v. State, 553 P.2d 40, 47 (Alaska 1976).
134. Id.
135. See State v. Ladd, 951 P.2d 1220, 1222 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
136. Id. at 1222-23 (citing Criminal Rule 6(q), as interpreted in Sheldon v.
State, 796 P.2d 831, 837 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990)).
137. See id. at 1225.
138. Id. at 1223.
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This distinction is not convincing.  A grand jury determination
of probable cause has limited utility; it is necessary for a felony in-
dictment that would subject the juvenile to automatic waiver to
adult court.  After trial, a determination of probable cause that the
juvenile committed the more serious offense should have no bear-
ing on further disposition of the case. The juvenile’s sentence
should be solely a factor of the crimes of which he was found
guilty.
The Alaska Supreme Court already has rejected standardless
discretion in juvenile cases.139  In P.H. v. State, the court refused to
permit prosecuting officials to evade the juvenile system by de-
clining to bring charges until a child’s eighteenth birthday.140  The
court noted that “serious constitutional issues would arise if the
nature of the proceedings against a child offender were to depend
on the arbitrary decision of law enforcement officials.”141
The lack of a meaningful judicial determination before trans-
fer has caused other state courts to reject similar waiver or transfer
provisions as unconstitutional.  The Supreme Court of Delaware
rejected the constitutionality of a statute that provided for auto-
matic transfer to adult court of children who had committed crimes
as minors but who had reached the age of eighteen prior to adjudi-
cation.142  The court found the statute “patently arbitrary and
bear[ing] no rational relationship to a legitimate government in-
terest,”143 primarily because the prosecutor could exercise complete
discretion in delaying a trial until the minor’s eighteenth birthday.
The court determined that the lack of judicial review in the waiver
process resulted in “the unfettered authority of the state to impose
potential arbitrary or capricious charging decisions, a practice
viewed as unconstitutional by this Court in [an earlier case.]”144
Pursuant to the waiver statute, decisions were not made with a
public, reviewable judicial determination taking into account a
child’s individual circumstances, but instead behind the closed
door of the prosecutor’s office.145  The court declared:
Under this scenario, the fate of a child is entirely entrusted –
without impartial judicial review – to the charging authority,
which unilaterally decides whether to charge a child with a fel-
ony or misdemeanor, without a mechanism to challenge its
charging decision or transfer the case to the appropriate forum.
139. See P.H. v. State, 504 P.2d 837, 842 (Alaska 1972).
140. See id.
141. Id.
142. See Hughes v. State, 653 A.2d 241 (Delaware 1994).
143. Id. at 253.
144. Id. at 247.
145. See id. at 248-50.
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In essence, the statutory amendment has stripped the judiciary
of its independent jurisdictional role in the adjudication of chil-
dren by granting the charging authority the unbridled discretion
to unilaterally determine which forum has jurisdiction.146
Utah’s legislature drafted a “direct-file” scheme, which was
rejected by its supreme court in 1995.  The Utah legislation
granted discretion to prosecuting authorities to determine in which
forum a juvenile offender would be brought to trial.147  Under the
Utah statute, prosecutors could file charges against some juveniles
in adult court and permit others to remain in the juvenile system.148
Utah’s highest court found that the statute was unconstitutional
under the state constitution’s “uniform application of the laws”
clause.149  The clause functions similar to Alaska’s Equal Protection
Clause and states that “[a]ll laws of a general nature shall have uni-
form  operation.”150  The Utah court examined the statute and
found it unconstitutional as applied:
We next consider whether the law in question “applies equally to
all members within each class or subclass . . . .  Defendants con-
tend that because they are being tried as adults for the same
crimes that some of their peers will be tried for as juveniles, they
are treated disparately.  The State counters that being tried as a
juvenile is not a “right” of anyone per se and that by bestowing a
benefit on some juveniles but choosing not to bestow that same
benefit on others, the legislature is not taking any rights away
but merely giving benefits to appropriate persons.  We are un-
able to reconcile this argument with the concept of uniform op-
eration of laws because the selection process for beneficial
treatment is arbitrary and standardless.151
By conferring complete authority on the prosecutor to determine
where charges are filed, the Utah statute threatened arbitrary dis-
tinctions between similar juveniles.
The Alaska waiver provision operates similarly: the prosecu-
tor’s charging decision determines whether an offender will be
waived automatically.  If the prosecutor determines that he or she
does not want the particular juvenile to be subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the adult court, he or she merely has to reduce the charges.
146. Id. at 249.
147. See State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991 (Utah 1995).
148. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-25 (6) (1987) (repealed 1996).
149. Mohi, 901 P.2d at 991.
150. Id. at 995.  The constitutional provision requires that “persons similarly
situated be treated similarly.”  Analysis under this provision is similar to an equal
protection analysis in that the court must examine first whether the law applies
equally to all classes of persons, and second, whether the legislature had a rea-
sonable objective for the disparity.  See id. at 997.
151. Id. at 998.
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This is unfair to juveniles who are not the objects of favoritism or
mitigating circumstances that may resonate with a particular
prosecutor.
Other state courts have grappled with waiver statutes that
shift the burden of proof to the juvenile and have found them con-
stitutional.  In these cases, however, the law at issue created a
“rebuttable presumption” that the juvenile was unfit for treatment,
a presumption that could be challenged at a waiver hearing prior
to the transfer to adult court.  Alaska has a similar provision for
minors who are charged with serious felonies but who are not old
enough to be automatically waived.152  These statutes require juve-
niles to bear the burden of proof at a hearing to show that they can
be rehabilitated while in the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.153
The hearing permits the juvenile to challenge the presumption be-
fore transfer, and therefore, is in no sense automatic.
For example, California courts presume that minors over six-
teen who have committed serious offenses, including murder, ar-
son, and armed robbery, are unfit for treatment in a juvenile facil-
ity.154  However, a minor “presumed unfit” and remanded to
criminal court may first try to convince the juvenile court that he is
amenable to treatment using five criteria: (1) the degree of crimi-
nal sophistication exhibited by the minor; (2) the degree to which
the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juve-
nile court’s jurisdiction; (3) the minor’s previous delinquent his-
tory; (4) the court’s prior success in rehabilitatating the minor; and
(5) the circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged to have
been committed by the minor.155  A juvenile charged with other of-
fenses also may be remanded to criminal court if the state proves
that the juvenile is unfit for available treatment under the above
criteria.  Although California shifts the burden of proof to the ju-
venile, its statute does not have the same equal protection implica-
tions as Alaska’s automatic waiver provision.  In California, the
presumption of unfitness arises before the juvenile is transferred to
adult court, and therefore, the juvenile has the opportunity to re-
152. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.100(c) (Michie 1996).  Under this provision, if a
minor is charged with a specified felony and is younger than sixteen, “the minor is
rebuttably presumed not to be amenable to treatment . . . and has the burden of
proof of showing that [he] is amenable to treatment.”  Id.  If unable to prove that
he is amenable to treatment at a waiver hearing, the juvenile will be tried in adult
court.  Id.
153. See, e.g., CAL. WELF & INST. CODE § 707 (West 1998); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:4A-26 (West 1987).
154. See CAL. WELF & INST. CODE § 707 (West 1998); see also Hicks v. Supe-
rior Court, 43 Cal. App. 4th 1649, 1654 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
155. See CAL. WELF & INST. CODE § 707 (West 1998).
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but that presumption and make a case for the possibility of reha-
bilitation under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.  In Alaska,
the juvenile charged with a serious offense is sent directly to adult
court, and even after having been found not guilty of the more se-
rious crime, he is presumed unfit for treatment as a juvenile.
Similarly, New Jersey permits waiver of juveniles over the age
of fourteen to adult court after a hearing.156  The transfer of a juve-
nile to adult court under the New Jersey Code of Juvenile Justice
involves two stages.157  First, the prosecutor must establish prob-
able cause that the juvenile committed a serious offense.  This
“creates a rebuttable presumption that the juvenile will be trans-
ferred to adult court.”158  Second, the juvenile may defeat that pre-
sumption by demonstrating the probability of his rehabilitation by
age nineteen and showing that the probability of rehabilitation
substantially outweighs the reason for waiver.159  Admittedly, a ju-
venile must overcome a very difficult burden to remain in the New
Jersey juvenile system.  However, unlike Alaska, each juvenile re-
ceives an opportunity to convince the court that waiver is inappro-
priate.
V. THE THIRD PRONG: THE MEANS TO ENDS FIT
The third prong of equal protection analysis under the Alaska
Constitution requires the court to examine whether the legislature
has tailored the statute to fit the stated objectives of the legisla-
tion.160  The narrowness of the fit required depends on the amount
of scrutiny granted by the court under the first prong of the test.161
Even if the interest is not found to be very important, the state
must be able to show that the statute has “a fair and substantial
relation” to its intended goals.162  However, when an important in-
terest is implicated, the fit must be much closer.163  Although the
legislature may have had legitimate reasons for enacting the auto-
matic waiver law, the means it chose do not closely fit its goals.
156. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-26 (West 1987).
157. See In the Interest of A.L., 638 A.2d 814, 819 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1994).
158. Id.
159. See id.
160. See State v. Anthony, 810 P.2d 155, 157 (Alaska 1991).
161. See id.
162. Id. at 159.
163. See id. at 157.
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A. The Provision is Broad-Reaching
The superior court, finding that the statute affected an impor-
tant interest of juveniles, subjected it to a high level of scrutiny.164
The court held:
The purpose of the legislation was to treat sixteen and seventeen
year old individuals who commit the serious crimes set forth in
[current Alaska Statutes section 47.12.030(a)] as adults.  How-
ever, once a juvenile is convicted of a lesser crime than those
specified . . . the legislative purpose is no longer being met.  The
continuing treatment of a juvenile as an adult, unless the juvenile
meets the burden of proof to be remanded to juvenile jurisdic-
tion, does not meet the end objective of having only juveniles
who commit the crimes specified . . . treated as adults.165
The court determined that the classification was “unreasonable”
and lacked a fair and substantial relationship to the legislation’s
stated purpose.166
The court of appeals reversed the superior court and granted
only minimum scrutiny to the burden-shifting provision of the
waiver statute.167  The court then found a “reasonably close fit” be-
tween the purpose of the statute and the means employed by the
legislature.168  The court of appeals argued that “Ladd and other
minors like him are not barred from receiving a juvenile disposi-
tion for their criminal acts.”169  According to the court, shifting the
burden merely represents a reallocation of risk, as the party with
the burden of proof bears the risk that the trier of fact will not be
persuaded.170  As the court recognized, effectively “in close cases,
when the evidence yields no answer to the question of whether the
minor can be rehabilitated within the juvenile system by age
twenty, the legislature wants the minor to receive an adult pen-
alty.”171
In analyzing the burden-shifting provision as such a
“legislative directive,” the Ladd court found a reasonably close fit
between the provision and the purposes of the statute as stated
above.172  Although minors are given the opportunity to prove their
164. See State v. Nao, Case No. 4FA-94-3671CR, at 19 (Alaska Super. Ct. Mar.
8, 1995).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See State v. Ladd, 951 P.2d 1220, 1224 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
168. Id. at 1225.
169. Id.
170. See id. (citing United Bank Alaska v. Dischner, 685 P.2d 90, 93 (Alaska
1984)).
171. Id.
172. Id.
MAY.QUALITY.DOC 11/13/98  10:44 AM
1998] JUVENILE AUTOMATIC WAIVER LAW 395
amenability to treatment, the statute mandates that the minor sus-
tain a heavy burden of proof.173  Despite the fact that the minor
may be in a better position to provide the court information about
their familial and educational experiences,174 other factors that the
court may consider – such as available treatment facilities175 – may
be beyond the minor’s ability to research adequately and address
in court.
Placing the burden of proof on the juvenile creates a legal pre-
sumption that the juvenile will be tried as an adult.176  The minor
will bear the risk that the evidence is inconclusive and “insufficient
to persuade the trier of fact that either party is correct.”177  These
juveniles will be more likely to lose at a waiver hearing, ensuring
that some juveniles who might otherwise benefit from treatment in
juvenile facilities will be sent to adult prisons.
The minor already has presented a defense in criminal court
and has been found not guilty of the more serious crimes.  The pre-
sumption of unamenability discriminates against him compared to
others who originally were charged with the same lesser crime.  Al-
though this second group of juveniles may have to defend against
the state’s waiver petition, they do not have to persuade the trier
of fact that they should remain in juvenile court.  This discrimina-
tion does not closely serve the state’s purpose, as found by the su-
perior court, to sentence minors who commit serious crimes as
adults.178
Prior to 1994, waiver required the state to make a two-fold
showing: first, that there was probable cause to believe that the
minor committed the offense; and second, that the minor was not
amenable to treatment.179  Automatic waiver, based on a grand jury
indictment, eradicates any adversarial proceeding at which the ju-
venile can introduce evidence regarding his amenability to reha-
bilitation.  It focuses solely on the nature of the crime charged,
without consideration of the causes of the minor’s behavior.  The
purposes of waiver hearings are thus lost – juveniles who can be
rehabilitated are not separated from those who cannot be treated
and both groups are sent to adult court.  Even after the probable
173. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.030(a) (Michie 1996).
174. See House Judiciary, Letter of Intent, supra note 67.
175. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.100(b) (Michie 1996).
176. See Ladd, 951 P.2d at 1225.
177. Id. (citing Dischner, 685 P.2d at 93).
178. See State v. Nao, Case No. 4FA-94-3671CR, at 17 (Alaska Super. Ct. Mar.
8, 1995).
179. See Former ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.020 (Michie 1995).
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cause determination is found to have been in error, the path is dif-
ficult for a minor to return to the juvenile system.
B. The Provision is Discriminatory as Applied
Statutes that are facially constitutional may be unconstitu-
tional as applied.180  The discretionary aspects of automatic waiver
permit the prosecuting authorities to discriminate in determining
which minors can remain in the juvenile system and which cannot.
The shift in the burden of proof then perpetuates this discrimina-
tion even after a trial where the minor has been found not guilty of
the waivable offense.
Despite the fact that the statute outlines the specific charges
for which waiver is warranted, prosecuting authorities are left with
wide-open discretion to determine which juveniles will be sent to
adult court.  There are a number of reasons for which a juvenile
may be waived that occur in the organizational context and have
nothing to do with the crime allegedly committed.181 Officials may
make decisions based on their judgment of the “moral character”
of the offender,182 whether the child has parental support avail-
able,183 or on their own perceptions based on irrational stereotypes,
such as race.184
Evidence shows that in Alaska, prosecutors are exercising dis-
cretion unrelated to “probable cause.”  In a number of cases,
prosecutors have charged juveniles with waivable offenses and
then reduced the charges to permit them to remain in the juvenile
system.  In 1996, two Pt. Hope juveniles used a gun to rob a man of
his paycheck.  Originally charged with first-degree assault, the
prosecutor reduced the charge to permit the youths to remain in
the juvenile system.185  Prosecutor Jim Benedetto later recalled,
“none of us – not me as prosecutor, not the defense lawyers, not
the judge were personally comfortable with the idea of prosecuting
those boys as adults.  The juvenile system had the tools to address
their behavior and prevent them from harming anyone in the fu-
180. See Gilmore v. Alaska Workers Compensation Bd., 882 P.2d 922, 932
(Alaska 1994).
181. See SIMON I. SINGER, RECRIMINALIZING DELINQUENCY 76-77 (1996).
182. See id.
183. See id. at 78.
184. See id. at 79.
185. Telephone Interview with Jim Benedetto, Assistant District Attorney in
Kenai District Attorney’s Office (Oct. 1, 1998).  According to Mr. Benedetto, the
two juveniles were under the influence of alcohol.  At least one of them was a
troubled youth who alternately pointed the gun at the victim and at himself.  See
id.
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ture.”186  In another case in Kotzebue, a minor violently attacked a
couple in their home, breaking several of his victim’s bones.187  Af-
ter being indicted for first-degree assault, the charges were later
reduced to allow the youth to be tried as a juvenile.188  In 1994, a
minor struck three students in the head with a hammer.  He was
charged with attempted murder, an automatic waiver offense, but
the district attorney in Anchorage declined to prosecute, and the
youth was returned to the juvenile system.189
These examples suggest that prosecuting authorities are con-
sidering the effect of the waiver provision in making charging deci-
sions.  For example, in the Pt. Hope case discussed above, the
prosecutor felt that “[t]he boys were not total screw-ups yet.  They
had either substance abuse or counseling issues that were not ad-
dressed and we didn’t think that it was appropriate to lock them up
and throw away the key without giving them another chance to ad-
dress those issues.”190  While this emphasis on rehabilitating youth-
ful offenders is laudable, there are no statutory criteria to guide
prosecutors in making these critical charging decisions, and there-
fore the discretionary aspect of the process may permit decisions
based on less appropriate reasons.
Additionally, the essential charging decision may be left in the
hands of inappropriate persons.  One Anchorage attorney asserts
that “in certain areas of the state, this decision appears to have
been delegated even further, to persons outside the prosecutorial
authority.”191  In a case where a juvenile attempted to rob a food
delivery man with a small gun, the minor remained in the juvenile
system.  In the pleadings in a different case, the state admitted that
the assistant district attorney “[did] not know why the juvenile
authorities charged [that] defendant with second degree robbery
instead of first degree robbery.”192
There may be no explicit reasoning regarding which juveniles
receive privileged treatment, as the West Virginia Supreme Court
recently speculated in a case involving a similar waiver provision:
“[I]f two juveniles in different counties commit essentially the
186. Id.
187. See id.
188. See id.
189. See Defendant’s Motion for Discovery, State v. Lewandowski, No. 3AN-
S97-8370, at 5 (Alaska Super. Ct. Jan. 16, 1998).
190. Benedetto Interview, supra note 185.
191. Defendant’s Motion for Discovery, State v. Lewandowski, No. 3AN-S97-
8370, at 3 (Alaska Super. Ct. Jan. 16, 1998).
192. Pleading, State v. Lockhart, No. 3AN-96-2360 (Alaska Super. Ct. Aug. 17,
1997) (quoted in Defendant’s Motion for Discovery, State v. Lewandowski, No.
3AN-S97-8370, at 6 (Alaska Super. Ct. Jan. 16, 1998)).
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same offense, and are essentially alike in terms of their ‘personal
factors,’ one juvenile could be transferred to adult status and one
remain as a juvenile – depending solely upon the different philoso-
phies of two different prosecutors.”193  One scholar has recognized
that the discretionary aspect makes it likely that charges will vary
for similar crimes among geographic areas, noting that “[l]egal de-
cision making is not only a product of principles as explicitly or
implicitly stated in legal rules but also the types of offenses and of-
fenders that officials routinely see in their particular legal set-
ting.”194  This can be to the disadvantage of youths from areas
where violent crime is more prevalent.195
In Alaska, violent crime is much more prevalent in urban ar-
eas.196  In rural areas, especially tribal communities, prosecutorial
discretion may be exercised to prevent local children from being
removed from the juvenile system.  Urban youths may not have
the benefit of the charging prosecutor knowing their family, as
might be the case for youths living in small towns or villages.  An
urban prosecutor wearied by a high volume of violent offense cases
may not be as willing to see the individual circumstances behind a
juvenile’s case and offer a juvenile “a second chance” consistent
with the goals of the juvenile justice system.
Examples of potential discriminatory applications of the stat-
ute reveal its impact on juvenile adjudication.  In sum, the legisla-
tion does not bear even a fair and substantial relationship to its in-
tended purpose.  The supreme court should declare Alaska
Statutes section 47.10.030 unconstitutional under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, and require the legislature to draft a constitutional al-
ternative.
VI. RECOMMENDED ALTERNATIVES
A. Shift the Burden Back
Some scholars believe that the increased use of waiver even-
tually will lead to the abolition of the juvenile justice system.197  By
193. State v. Robert McL., 496 S.E.2d 887, 891 (W. Va. 1997).
194. See SINGER, supra note 181, at 80.
195. See id. at 82.
196. See GOVERNOR’S CONFERENCE, supra note 118, at 252 (“19,500 of the
state’s 32,500 serious crimes were committed in the three largest cities.” (citing H.
Hodgkinson, Alaska: The Demographic Context, May 24, 1996)).
197. See Donna M. Bishop & Charles E. Frazier, Transfer of Juveniles to
Criminal Court: A Case Study and Analysis of Prosecutorial Waiver, 5 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 281, 285 (1991); SMITH, supra note 110, at 996.
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permitting juveniles to petition the court for return to the juvenile
system, the legislature has recognized that some juveniles will
benefit from treatment.  However, it has placed an unnecessary
hurdle in the path of these juveniles by shifting the burden of
proof.
The burden-shifting provision serves a number of different
purposes for the state: It facilitates sentencing juveniles as adults
and it places the responsibility for proffering evidence regarding a
juvenile’s rehabilitative prospects squarely on the juvenile.  Once
the facts are established at trial, however, the state has full access
to information regarding the juvenile’s history and the extent of his
participation in the offense.
The burden of proof at the waiver hearing should remain on
the state, which carried the burden at the trial.  The presumption
against the juvenile merely serves to make it more difficult for the
minor to return to children’s court, and reduces the state’s respon-
sibility at the waiver hearing.  By shifting the burden back, an ini-
tial prosecutorial theory that did not succeed at trial will not
handicap minors like Anthony Ladd twice during the judicial proc-
ess.
B. Dual-Sentencing and Treatment Options: Alternatives to
Automatic Waiver
Although this Note primarily has addressed the narrow consti-
tutional issue of the burden-shifting provision, it also has raised
concerns about the appropriateness of an automatic waiver system
in which the prosecutor determines the jurisdiction of a juvenile
defendant’s case.  Automatic waiver may not be necessary to en-
sure public safety; dual sentencing and other treatment options are
reasonable alternatives to automatic waiver that promote the safe
rehabilitation of violent youth while protecting the public welfare.
The Alaska legislature recently adopted a dual-sentencing
program,198 based on the Governor’s Conference recommendation
that this type of system would promote the safe rehabilitation of
juvenile defendants “at risk of becoming chronic serious juvenile
offenders.”199  Under this system, a young offender would receive
sentences under both the juvenile and the criminal codes.200  The
                                                                                                                                
For a recent study in favor of recriminalizing juvenile offense, see generally
SINGER, supra note 136.
198. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.065 (1998) (enacted July 1, 1998).
199. GOVERNOR’S CONFERENCE, supra note 118, at 251.
200. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.140(1) (1998) (instructing the court to
“consider both the best interests of the child and the interests of the public in
making its dispositional order”).
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adult sentence would be suspended unless certain conditions of the
juvenile sentence are violated.201
A district attorney may seek a dual sentence for minors who
are over the age of sixteen and who fit into one of two narrow
categories.202  The minor must be charged with a felony that is a
crime against a person and previously must have been adjudicated
a delinquent for another felony that was a crime against a person.203
If a minor is charged with sexual abuse of a minor in the second
degree, there is no requirement that the juvenile have committed
other crimes.204
In particular, minors in Anthony Ladd’s position would be
prime candidates for dual sentencing.  The legislature adopted the
burden-shifting provision for “close cases,” – where it is unclear
whether the juvenile can be rehabilitated successfully.205  Under a
dual sentence, the state can attempt to rehabilitate these minors
without sacrificing the option of adult sentencing in the event that
the treatment is unsuccessful.  Indeed, the threat of the implemen-
tation of a harsh criminal sentence may convince a minor to coop-
erate more fully in his treatment than if there were no further
sanctions for his criminal behavior.
A primary goal of Alaska’s juvenile justice system is to
“[a]ppropriately respond to a juvenile offender’s needs in a man-
ner that is consistent with preventing repeated criminal behavior
and with community and victim restoration, protection of the pub-
lic, and the development of the juvenile into a productive citi-
zen.”206  Along these lines, the suggestion of Abbe Smith, relating
201. Certain triggering conditions can reinstate an adult sentence if the of-
fender:
(1) commits a subsequent felony offense; (2) commits a subsequent of-
fense against a person that is a misdemeanor and involves injury to a
person or  the use of a deadly weapon; (3) fails to comply with the terms
of a restitution order; (4) fails to engage in or satisfactorily complete a
rehabilitation program ordered by a court or required by a facility or ju-
venile probation officer; or (5) escapes from a juvenile correctional fa-
cility.
ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.120(d) (1998).  The burden of proving by a preponderance
of the evidence that the minor committed one of the violations that triggers impo-
sition of the adult sentence on the state.  See id. § 47.12.120(e).  However, the mi-
nor can show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that mitigating circumstances
exist to justify a continued stay of the adult sentence and that the minor is ame-
nable to treatment as a juvenile.  See id.
202. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.065(a) (1998).
203. See id.
204. See id.
205. See State v. Ladd, 951 P.2d 1220, 1223 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
206. See GOVERNOR’S CONFERENCE, supra note 118, at 219.
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to the increase of the rehabilitative possibilities for troubled youth
is especially pertinent:
The commission of violent crime, like homicide and rape, should
not automatically trigger adulthood, though it might trigger
longer confinement in a juvenile institution and more intensive
treatment.  The longer confinement would both protect the pub-
lic and, given adequate resources, afford an opportunity for ef-
fective, long-term intervention . . . .  I would rather see an exten-
sion of the juvenile court’s power to hold a youth adjudicated
delinquent of murder or rape to age twenty-five, which would
allow a seventeen-year-old offender to be held for eight years –
nearly half the juvenile’s life – than to send the child to adult
court for a shorter sentence and no treatment.207
The success of a rehabilitation program may depend on in-
creasing the length and quality of juvenile treatment.  Consistent
with promoting rehabilitation, the state should work to improve its
juvenile treatment facilities.  The Governor’s Conference found
that “[t]he state simply does not have enough social workers, at-
torneys, judicial officers, treatment programs, beds in detention
and mental health facilities, or probation officers to effectively
deal with all juvenile offenders.”208  Even in cases where a  juvenile
is accused of the most serious crimes, both the juvenile and the
state have an important interest in the juvenile’s rehabilitation into
a productive member of society.  Alaska’s delinquency and waiver
laws should reflect that interest and provide its young offenders
with adequate and available treatment facilities, sufficient time for
rehabilitation, and equal access to the juvenile system.
VII.     CONCLUSION
An automatic waiver statute operates to remove children
from the juvenile system based solely on the crimes they are al-
leged to have committed.  Alaska’s legislature has recognized that
in some cases the violent nature of the crime indicates that there is
no hope for the juvenile’s rehabilitation.  In cases where a juvenile
is not convicted as charged after being sent to adult court, a strong
presumption against treatment remains.  The shift of the burden of
proof to the juvenile defendant reinforces legal and societal pre-
sumptions against treatment.  The current waiver scheme, which
imparts too much discretion to local prosecutors, invites bias and
discrimination to enter the decision-making process.
The Alaska Supreme Court now has the opportunity to rec-
ognize the importance of a minor’s individual right to be sentenced
as a juvenile.  The court should enforce Anthony Ladd’s equal pro-
207. Smith, supra note 108, at 1020-1021.
208. Id. at xi.
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tection rights under the Alaska Constitution and strike out the dis-
criminatory provision of the waiver law.
Kimberly S. May
